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the land and expressly reserving the water right, or by conveying the
land and water right separately. The new owner may not enlarge a
transferred water right beyond the original owner's use.
Once a water right is acquired, the holder must continue to use
the water right for a beneficial purpose or risk losing it through abandonment. Abandonment arises when there is nonuse and intent to
abandon. Evidence of a long period of continuous nonuse raises a rebuttable presumption of intent to abandon the water right.
In this instance, the spring water went unused on the small parcel
for a period of eleven years. M.S. Consulting argues that such nonuse
resulted in a loss of the water right. The Axtells argue that their
predecessors in interest did not abandon the water right because the
record shows that a water conveyance system existed during that time.
In reviewing the record, the court held that several issues of material fact existed with respect to the abandonment of the water right.
These disputes were material to the outcome of this case. If the water
right appurtenant to the small parcel was not abandoned, then the Axtells would have acquired the right. If abandoned, the water right was
not available to pass with the conveyance of the small parcel. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings.
Tracy Rogers

NORTH CAROLINA
King v. State of North Carolina, 481 S.E.2d 330 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)
(finding that a refusal to grant a 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341 Clean Water Act
certification, which resulted in Plaintiff being unable to subdivide
property as she desired, did not constitute a denial of all economically
viable use of the property and therefore, no taking had occurred).
Plaintiff desired to build a road and construct a 50 lot subdivision
on her property-a peninsula. The originally proposed project called
for placing between 10,000 and 20,000 cubic yards of fill material on
the property. According to Clean Water Act section 404, Plaintiff must
obtain a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers "COE" prior to
placing fill material onto wetlands. In addition, Plaintiff must provide
the COE with a certification that discharge of fill material is consistent
with state water quality standards. The Division of Environmental
Management ("DEM"), the department responsible for reviewing section 401 certification requests, refused to issue a certification, finding
that the proposed wetland fill would degrade surrounding shellfish waters, and that there were less environmentally damaging alternatives
for construction of the road.
Plaintiff appealed the decision, and later filed a claim asserting
that the decision to refuse section 401 certification and the section 404
permit had denied Plaintiff all reasonable use of her property and,
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therefore, constituted a taking.
The court found that because the DEM had determined that less
environmentally damaging alternatives for construction of the road existed, the state had not denied Plaintiff all economically viable use of
her property. The State had no obligation to allow Plaintiff the most
profitable use of her property; it must only allow some economically
viable use of the property.
Under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that to support a takings claim, Plaintiff must show either a
physical invasion or that the State's action has denied her all economically beneficial or productive use of her land. The test in North Carolina for determining whether a taking has occurred, set out in Finch v.
City of Durham, is whether the property has a practical use and a reasonable value. The State contends that because the decision not to
grant the permit only affects one quarter of Plaintiffs entire parcel,
and because other alternatives for road construction and development
of the property are available, the property still has a practical use and
reasonable value. Therefore, an essential element of Plaintiffs takings
claim-deprivation of all practical use and reasonable value, is eliminated. By establishing that alternatives existed to Plaintiff's proposed
plan, the court determined that the State had met its burden of proving that Plaintiff had not been deprived of all practical use and reasonable value of her property.
Heidi A. Anderson

Pine Knoll Ass'n v. Cardon, 484 S.E.2d 446 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that where the configuration of the shoreline is irregular, the
proper allocation of water space between abutting riparian owners is
governed by a "rule of reasonableness," and is a question for the jury).
Pine Knoll Shores Association ("Pine") and Cardon owned adjacent waterfront property along the Davis Landing Canal (the "Canal").
Pine, a homeowner association, owned a tract of land that ran along
the Canal's end. Cardon, a member of the association, owned a lot
situated immediately west of Pine's property with a small protrusion of
its boundary located on the western bank of the Canal. A seawall ran
east-west along Pine's property and north-south along Cardon's land.
Pine had earlier adopted a restrictive covenant prohibiting the placement of obstructions in the extensions of the property lines abutting
the Canal. Cardon maintained a dock along his property and moored
two boats, approximately thirty feet in length, perpendicular to the
dock and parallel to Pine's seawall.
Pine claimed that the boats intruded upon, and interfered with, its
right of access to the Canal, and sued for violation of the restrictive
covenants, trespass and violation of its riparian rights. At trial, Pine
withdrew its complaint for violation of the covenants, and the court
granted summary judgment for the Defendant on the two remaining

